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
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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

5 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

[redacted]
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Warning

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SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for September 1984

1. Summary of key warning issues:

USSR

There is general consensus that Marshal Ogarkov's removal is related to political maneuvering over succession. He may have overstepped the limits of a high-level military figure. [redacted]

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[redacted] In any case, a political transition is certainly underway with most analysts seeing Gorbachev as the likely successor.

NIO/Warning believes Ogarkov should not be dismissed in our analysis. While he has been replaced, he has not been disgraced. [redacted] Ogarkov's previous high profile at press conferences and in public statements defending Soviet actions is impressive and suggests that he may not have entirely lost the confidence of the leadership.

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Ogarkov has been reported to be the new "Commander in Chief of the Western Theater of Combat Operations." In his General Staff responsibility,

[redacted]
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he had overseen a major reorganization and improvement in theater C², encouraged stockpiling to fight a conventional war, downplayed the feasibility of a US first strike (ref Pershing II), emphasized enhanced technological conventional weapons and generally stressed Soviet capability to fight a conventional war.

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USSR/Berlin

The Soviets continue to make extensive reservations of airspace in the corridors. [] they have engaged in pressure tactics to gain unilateral control over allied access to Berlin. They preclude allied access by not guaranteeing, for the duration of a reservation, the safety of Western aircraft. The Soviets have been inflexible at quadripartite controller meetings and apparently believe that low-key negotiations and relatively slight public knowledge of corridor harassment work to their advantage over time. NIO/Warning agrees [] that the Soviets will try to buttress their claim to unilateral control by pointing to allied compliance with the restrictions. We concur with NIO/USSR that the total range of Soviet activities in and around Berlin, including political protests about FRG actions, are designed to remind the West of and reinforce West Berlin's vulnerability.

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USSR/Mid East

The transfer of SA-5s to Syrian control has begun. If Israel increases reconnaissance flights over Lebanon, the Syrians may be more inclined to use the SA-5s. This could bring a new spiral of actions and reactions resulting in greater Soviet involvement.

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Morocco-Libya

The implementation of the union of Morocco and Libya is proceeding smoothly.

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Chad

The withdrawal of French forces from Chad will leave a vacuum which will be difficult for Habre to fill. A resumption of fighting is likely unless the French are prepared to bolster the Habre forces and unless the Libyans cease their clandestine aid to the southern dissidents.

Narcotics

Corruption has become rampant in Mexico's once-successful antinarcotics program and probably is a major cause of the resurgence in Mexico's opium production. Other factors that add to the threat are [redacted] logistic problems, improved trafficking countermeasures, and the depressed state of the Mexican economy. President de la Madrid is personally committed to the antinarcotics program, but preoccupation with reviving the economy and maintaining political order likely preclude the widespread personnel and program changes that are required. It is too late to stave off large increases in Mexican heroin available for export to the US this year.

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2. Trend Commentary:

USSR/Iran/Iraq

The Soviets continue their tilt toward Iraq [redacted]
[redacted] There has been no perceptible movement of Soviet relations with Iran despite Tehran's interest in improved relations.

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Greece

Whether or not elections are called for the spring of 1985, the pre-election period has begun and analysts warn that Papandreu's rhetoric against the US, Turkey and NATO is likely to increase. Leaders striving to portray themselves as nationalists will leave little room for accommodation toward Turkey or Cyprus issues.

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5 October 1984

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SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for September 1984

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